In 2016, my wife and I filed the first shareholder proposal dealing specifically with sea level rise impacts to shareholders of a major electric utility. Although there have been plenty of global warming proposals from investors, ours specifically requested that NextEra, the parent company of FPL, advise shareholders of its vulnerability -- both markets and infrastructure -- to sea level rise. (Those interested, can read more by clicking this link.)
We were pleasantly surprised that in April 2017 our proposal garnered more than 20 percent of shareholders who voted; mainly very large institutional investors.
Leaving aside the question whether NextEra or ratepayers like you and me can weather a continuous financial storm, the equivalent of a Category 5 hurricane, represented by rapid sea level rise, it caught our attention that the conservative Manhattan Institute recently addressed the issue for its supporters. The Manhattan Institute primarily reflects the views of the fossil fuel supply chain, including electric utilities.
Here is its money shot:
What does this mean for Manhattan Institute supporters from the ranks of corporate America and climate-change denialism? Based on past experience, we can extrapolate: more opposition to and perhaps even suppression of shareholder activists like us.
Climate-Change Proposals Break Through
By James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe
Mr. Copland is a senior fellow with and director of legal policy at the Manhattan Institute.
Ms. O’Keefe is the Manhattan Institute’s Proxy Monitor project manager.
The Manhattan Institute’s Proxy Monitor database, launched in 2011, is the first publicly available database cataloging shareholder proposals and Dodd-Frank-mandated executive-compensation advisory votes[1] at America’s largest publicly traded companies. Findings and reports by James R. Copland, Manhattan Institute senior fellow and director of legal policy, and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor project manager, draw upon information in the database to examine shareholder activism in which investors attempt to influence corporate management through the shareholder-proposal process.[2] The conclusions in these reports are the authors’ own and do not reflect an institutional view of the Manhattan Institute.
We were pleasantly surprised that in April 2017 our proposal garnered more than 20 percent of shareholders who voted; mainly very large institutional investors.
Leaving aside the question whether NextEra or ratepayers like you and me can weather a continuous financial storm, the equivalent of a Category 5 hurricane, represented by rapid sea level rise, it caught our attention that the conservative Manhattan Institute recently addressed the issue for its supporters. The Manhattan Institute primarily reflects the views of the fossil fuel supply chain, including electric utilities.
Here is its money shot:
The shift in institutional investors’ support for climate-change-related shareholder proposals in 2017 may augur a paradigm shift in the shareholder-engagement process—as activists target institutional investors themselves as a tactic through which they hope to influence corporate behavior. Institutional investors may be less sensitive to the full panoply of social-investing concerns, beyond climate change and gender, but these trends deserve careful attention in the future.
What does this mean for Manhattan Institute supporters from the ranks of corporate America and climate-change denialism? Based on past experience, we can extrapolate: more opposition to and perhaps even suppression of shareholder activists like us.
Climate-Change Proposals Break Through
By James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe
Mr. Copland is a senior fellow with and director of legal policy at the Manhattan Institute.
Ms. O’Keefe is the Manhattan Institute’s Proxy Monitor project manager.
The Manhattan Institute’s Proxy Monitor database, launched in 2011, is the first publicly available database cataloging shareholder proposals and Dodd-Frank-mandated executive-compensation advisory votes[1] at America’s largest publicly traded companies. Findings and reports by James R. Copland, Manhattan Institute senior fellow and director of legal policy, and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor project manager, draw upon information in the database to examine shareholder activism in which investors attempt to influence corporate management through the shareholder-proposal process.[2] The conclusions in these reports are the authors’ own and do not reflect an institutional view of the Manhattan Institute.














