It is a popular confusion that what is good for corporations is also good for the public.
It may finally become evident the extent to which social engineering is the goal of a tiny class of executives whose compensation has no correlation to that which benefits society, much less common shareholders or owners of mutual funds in pension plans.
One of these large public corporations, Lowe's Home Imrpovement, succeeded this week in obtaining the support of enough county commissioners to override the veto of Mayor Carlos Alvarez and move the Urban Development Boundary. What a great victory for the neighborhood, it was claimed. "We can now move forward," said the lobbyist for the project that had been turned down twice before.
But where are we moving forward to?
An example, before returning to the UDB, is in the corporate behavior of International Paper whose senior vice president, David Struhs, was formerly Jeb Bush's loyal chief environmental officer.
While Secretary of FDEP, Struhs had proposed to issue a permit and other regulatory authorizations sought by International Paper (IP), to allow effluent discharge 23.8 million gallons of industrial wastewater effluent from its Cantonment paper mill into waters of the state. Friends of Perdido Bay sued.
In August 2007, after eleven days of testimony, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended denial of the permit application. In response, FDEP chief Michael Sole, Stuhs' successor, issued a press statement that while the Secretary “does not agree with all the Judge’s rulings,” he was nonetheless denying the permits.
When the Florida Department of Environmental Protection issued a final order denying International Paper’s application, International Paper instantly appealed and submitted a new permit application; virtually the same permit application that the court had rejected.
A stay pending appeal was immediately granted by DEP, allowing in effect IP’s discharge into 11 Mile Creek to continue unabated. Friends of Perdido Bay filed a cross appeal challenging a portion of the state law that allows DEP to issue or renew an operating permit so long as “granting the operation permit will be in the public interest.”
When William Evans, Domestic Wastewater Permitting Supervisor with the Department’s Northwest District Office, was asked by the Friends' attorney how the determination was made that IP’s noncompliant discharge would be in the public interest, he answered: DEP had basically considered “International Paper’s interest as public interest in our test.”
Lowe's and the other application by Brown to move the UDB in Miami-Dade were also repeat applications that had previously been rejected. They were given energy by the entire spectrum of pro-development advocates who are down on their luck because of the real estate crash, but are nevertheless compensated, ultimately, by increase in unit volume of sales.
That is what IP is looking for and it is the corporate definition of the public interest.
What supporters of Hold The Line advocate is based on another test of the public interest: first, for MIami-Dade county to fund and implement all the unabsorbed costs of growth: some $6 billion in infrastructure improvements are hidden in backlogs by county departments. That does not even include the billions for wastewater cleansing as a component of state requirements.
Containing costs-- to our quality of life, to our environment, to the public health-- is what good planning principles intend to do and what politicians routinely violate with bad zoning and permitting decisions.
Containing costs is also what corporations would do if their key executives were not compensated on the basis of externalizing as many costs as possible.
This is the International Paper story writ large. According to the Friends' attorney Marcy LaHart, "IP has had literally decades to come into compliance. And DEP, rather than enforcing our environmental laws and fining IP for its pollution, instead grants more permits and waivers and variances with a few more years and then a few more years to come into compliance. Pollution control technology costs money, cutting production to stay within discharge limits costs money, why cut into profits when you can just get your consent order “administratively continued” for almost 20 years?"
What has happened to Perdido Bay is no different from the travesty in Florida Bay or the St. Lucie Estuary or the waters off Sanibel or, for that matter, Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades: what these degraded water bodies reflect is a form of social engineering that imposes enormous costs on ordinary citizens. When citizens rise up to claim that externalized costs must be responsibly and quickly addressed by corporations, they are slapped down: in this case, by the supposed party of fiscal conservatism-- Republicans who are really drunken sailors gone wild.
In the case of the Urban Development Boundary, it remains to be seen whether the Crist administration will defend growth management and, in doing so, skirmish on yet another front with remnants of the Jeb Bush crew.
It is no wonder that citizens are exhausted coping with the strategies and manipulation of the public interest; a form of social engineering that leaves people struggling with two car payments, rising mortgage expenses, gas costs and no time to ponder how the fraud and manipulation extend straight through the ranks of politics and the law.
Friends' attorney LaHart writes of their terrible fix and a familiar refrain to any citizen who has engaged in stopping government from violating its own laws: "This leaves my supposedly victorious clients with two options. Option number one, hope the same proposal will work, a ten mile pipeline to wetlands bordering Perdido Bay, even though they already defeated that proposal once when the Judge did not believe the wetlands could assimilate IP’s waste. Option number two, lawyer up and hire experts and spend thousands of dollars to challenge the “new” permit all over again-whether the appeal in the First District Court of Appeals is successful or not. Even though we are the so called “prevailing party” in the previous permit challenge, for their efforts my clients appear to be no closer to their ultimate goal of clean water in Perdido Bay."
In Miami-Dade, citizens will have to "lawyer up" too. Back in November, the county commission said it wanted to have the benefit of input from the state on the applications to move the Urban Development Boundary. Cynics who didn't believe the commissioners were proven right when the state gave them the bad news and advised the county to stay within their own planning rules and guidelines and, then, county commissioners ignored the state and Mayor Carlos Alvarez.
Even if citizens prevail and the unreformable majority of county commissioners are defeated in court, it is hard to know who among the electorate will remember enough, or even whether the court challenge and results would be heard early enough to influence the November elections.
On the political side, there should be a cost to the incumbents for what happened in Miami-Dade: they should be returned to the private sector where they can do less harm.
On the economic side, I am afraid that it will take an economic catastrophe, on the order of a Great Depression, to reign in the power of corporations to do their social engineering.
Marcy LaHart writes, "Last May while we were in the middle of the hearing regarding IP’s permit, IP issued a press release which announced it was closing its mill in Terre Haute, Indiana. According to IP, "The mill's relatively small size and high manufacturing costs hindered its long-term competitiveness, and ultimately have led to our decision to close the mill." Obviously, when it is in IP’s economic interest to close a mill, it does so. If IP can not operate the Cantonment mill profitably and in compliance with environmental regulations, that mill should be closed too."
But IP can operate the Florida mill profitably, because the Florida legislature is deaf, dumb and blind to the fraud of the FDEP motto: "less process, more protection". But this form of social engineering has very steep costs for the entire nation, misled as we have been by the advocates of "shrinking the size of government so that it can be drowned in a bathtub."
Who wins, by the drowning? As long as the public interest is allowed, by politicians, to be defined as that which benefits corporations--and mainly the externalization of costs to be the integral feature of wealth creation for key executives-- the security of the United States is in doubt.
We are not threatened by external terrorist threats so much as the kind of logic that prevails in such cases as International Paper where the State of Florida moved to dismiss Friends of Perdido based on their having supposedly won: “You cannot appeal a case that you won” FDEP’s attorney, David Thulman has argued.
For corporate interests seeking to move the UDB, integral to their plans for personal wealth is the delay, postponement and continued piling on of costs that will have to be paid, somewhere, at some time, by someone. That someone who would be the funder of last resort is you and me.
For the most part, Americans are poorer and less secure than we were, even at the height of the Cold War. The sucking sound you hear is the accumulated wealth of a nation, our own, being drained. It is no wonder we feel our pockets are being picked clean. We are no match for the hidden costs of living we tolerate, meek as lambs.
6 comments:
Excellent! I have found that for a republican to be elected he only has to accept tons of money from a large corporation and he wins and then forever after is in debt to large corporations. Therefore we have a simple solution-Never vote republican!
I cannot comment beyond:
GOOD POST!
I totally agree Gimleteye...you have to start a file: Gimleteye Favorites and put this in.
Dear Mensa:
Mensa in Spanish means "fool" -if you follow my drift!
How lucky I am not to be Spanish.
Why CEO pay fed the mortgage mess
How did the nation's biggest banks stumble into the subprime crisis? Consider this: Lax boards dangled huge rewards for short-term performance with little incentive to limit risk.
By Michael Brush
CNN
If you're wondering how otherwise extremely bright people at the top of our country's best banks led us into the subprime mess, here's a simple answer:
There was too much money in it for them to resist.
We hear all the time that companies have to pay top execs tens of millions of dollars a year to "attract the top talent."
But dangling huge payouts in front of bank CEOs in exchange for short-term bursts of growth brought just the opposite: the worst performance by some of the best-paid execs in decades, taking a big toll on homeowners and bogging down the whole economy.
Countrywide Financial (CFC, news, msgs) chief Angelo Mozilo cashed out $400 million in stock options from 2003 to 2007. In 2007 and 2008, the company's stock fell to multiyear lows, and the lender may soon disappear.
Washington Mutual (WM, news, msgs) chief Kerry Killinger took home $24 million in 2006. A crash that started in 2007 as subprime-related problems surfaced has wiped out all shareholder gains since 2000.
The head of Merrill Lynch (MER, news, msgs) got $160 million upon his retirement last year; the head of Citigroup (C, news, msgs) collected $40 million. This happened in the same period both stocks plunged more than 40%.
And former Bear Stearns (BSC, news, msgs) CEO James Cayne got $39 million in bonus pay alone for 2004-06. He left in January of this year, just before his bank had to be bailed out with help from the Federal Reserve to avert a disaster that might have brought down much of the U.S. financial system.
Despite all the problems they helped create, these execs get to keep that loot. For that, blame lousy boards of directors for poorly designed pay plans that encouraged Wall Street's elite to take too much risk on the subprime mortgages that have caused so many problems. Here are four ways the boards erred:
Too much, too soon
Mistake No. 1: Boards awarded too much bonus pay too fast in exchange for fleeting achievements, such as raising revenue or earnings growth in a single year.
This tempted execs to create a lot of fireworks in the near term without regard for how sustainable growth really was. After all, they got no reward for building lasting shareholder value. They could take the money right away and run, which is exactly what many did.
"Their bonuses and long-term incentives were largely tied to earnings targets," says Alexandra Higgins, a researcher at The Corporate Library, which tracks pay and corporate-governance issues. "Those earnings targets were directly linked to loan production."
So execs created as many mortgage loans as possible -- to heck with the consequences down the road -- in what The Corporate Library's Nell Minow describes as an "après moi le déluge" (after me the deluge) dynamic.
Home-mortgage lender Countrywide stands out as Exhibit A. Mozilo's huge stock-option grants vested quickly -- in equal slices over just three years. And a big chunk of bonus pay came in the form of cash paid immediately. His board offered no reward for creating lasting value.
Mozilo and his fellow execs had every incentive to stoke the subprime machine as hard as they could to rev up earnings and drive the stock higher. By 2004, Countrywide had become the largest U.S. mortgage lender, in part by lowering lending standards and pushing exotic mortgages that allowed borrowers to qualify for bigger loans.
Video: The highest-paid CEOs
Countrywide's performance responded, allowing Mozilo to exploit a compensation package that rewarded him for short-term gains. In 2006, Mozilo pocketed a $20.4 million cash bonus because earnings had advanced 4.6% to $4.30 a share. His total compensation that year was $102 million, if you include other kinds of pay and profits on options. Between 2004 and 2007, Mozilo cashed out options worth $414 million.
That's money Mozilo doesn't have to give back, even though Countrywide's fall has cost shareholders 88% losses since the start of 2007.
"Countrywide is probably the worst example," says Daniel Pedrotty, a corporate governance expert at the AFL-CIO's Office of Investment. But you see the same scenario across the financial sector.
At Wachovia (WB, news, msgs), for example, execs were richly rewarded for short-term earnings growth -- even through acquisitions. By 2006, this enticed them to buy Golden West, a California bank that was knee-deep in option adjustable-rate mortgages, known as ARMs.
ARMs can help borrowers because their interest rates are held artificially low for an initial time frame. But they are riskier, too: Homeowners eventually need to refinance or face much higher payments, but many people have found they can't refinance because home values are falling and loans are now harder to get.
Continued: Pay for risk
Wachovia acknowledges that buying Golden West near the peak of the housing boom was bad timing, but it thinks the purchase of Golden West will pay off in the long run.
"We purchased a solid company, and as the market begins to turn we feel we will be very well-positioned," a Wachovia spokesman says. The option ARM portfolio that Wachovia picked up through Golden West is also performing above industry averages, the spokesman says.
Meanwhile, executives at Wall Street investment banks such as Citigroup (C, news, msgs), Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch all reaped big annual bonus rewards in part for repackaging subprime loans into risky debt instruments that spread the damage around the globe.
Pay for risk
Problem No. 2: Bonus pay was linked to measures that encouraged execs to take on excess risk.
At virtually all of the major culprits in the subprime mess, including Countrywide, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and Bear Stearns, executive bonuses were directly linked to increases in return on equity, or ROE, which measures net income growth against stockholder equity.
Because one quick way to boost ROE is to assume more debt to increase growth, tying bonus pay to ROE encouraged execs to take on higher levels of risky debt linked to subprime loans.
For example, to keep up with competitors during the housing bubble, Washington Mutual shifted its loan mix away from standard fixed-rate mortgages toward riskier subprime and/or adjustable-rate mortgages that presented "much greater risk of default," says William Patterson, CtW Investment Group's executive director.
This helped prop up Washington Mutual stock in 2006 so that chief Killinger could realize $15 million by cashing out options and collect total pay that year of $24 million, according to The Corporate Library. But the next year, problems related to subprime loans hit the stock, costing shareholders $28 billion in a 71% stock price decline that "wiped out all of the shareholder value created since 2000," Patterson says.
Guaranteed windfalls
Problem No. 3: Boards offered execs huge guaranteed retirement pay and golden parachutes, regardless of how they performed.
Execs knew they could collect big severance and retirement pay even if their companies flamed out as they left. So they had little incentive to avoid getting their banks in trouble. For example:
Even though former Merrill Lynch CEO Stanley O'Neal oversaw Merrill's involvement in the subprime mess, he got more than $160 million in stock and retirement benefits when he left the bank in October. That's because it's Merrill Lynch policy to give employees, if they have worked there long enough, all of their restricted stock and unvested options from prior years. But much of the money was from stock awards granted during the six years O'Neal was CEO. Did he really deserve the money? Merrill Lynch stock lagged the S&P 500 Index ($INX) during this period, and shareholders lost 41% last year alone. In fairness, before he left Merrill Lynch, the company's policy also required O'Neal to keep 60% of the stock he was given, so he felt some pain along with shareholders.
Former Citigroup chief Charles Prince pocketed $40 million when he left the company last year, including a discretionary bonus of $10.4 million and more than $28 million in unvested stock and options that vested immediately, according to the AFL-CIO. As with Merrill, he got the stock and options automatically because he had worked at Citigroup long enough, almost 30 years. Shareholders haven't done so well, at least recently. They lost 2.5% a year while the S&P 500 was posting average annual gains of 12% during Prince's tenure as CEO from 2003 to 2007. Shareholders lost 45% last year alone.
Countrywide's Mozilo will collect $23.7 million in pension benefits and $20.6 million in deferred compensation when he leaves the company, according to The Corporate Library, despite the mess he helped create.
If Washington Mutual were to get bought out like Bear Stearns or Countrywide, its chief, Killinger, would get a golden parachute worth more than $22 million, according to the AFL-CIO.
Money, it's a gas
Mistake No. 4: The sheer size of the pay packages granted by boards created a hazard.
If you dangle huge potential rewards in front of someone, they are more likely to do dumb things in order to take a swing at the piñata.
Bear Stearns, for example, created a bonus pool for execs worth $165 million in 2006. The only restraint -- other than that the company had to meet minimal targets for things such as annual sales and earnings growth --- was that no single exec could get more than 30% of the pot.
With that kind of temptation, it should be little surprise that then-Bear Stearns chief Cayne led his bank into the subprime morass. Doing so helped him get $33.8 million in pay in 2006 alone, including a cash bonus of $17 million.
Video: The highest-paid CEOs
Cayne paid dearly along with shareholders when Bear Stearns blew up, because he owned a lot of stock. But he managed to keep enough dough to pay cash for a $25.8 million luxury condo recently on New York's Fifth Avenue.
Likewise, CEOs at Countrywide, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Wachovia and Washington Mutual all reaped annual pay of $20 million to $40 million during the go-go days of the housing boom. Because of the way their pay plans were structured, they knew all along that they could keep it no matter what happened.
Continued: What shareholders can do
What shareholders can do
If these kinds of stories tick you off and you want to make a difference, vote shares of stock you own in ways that bring about stronger boards. If you don't own stocks, make sure your mutual funds do this. Many shareholders don't bother to vote.
Activists have placed a variety of measures on ballots that allow shareholders a voice on executive pay and promote independent boards:
"Say on pay" proposals give shareholders a vote on executive pay packages.
Other proposals do things such as adjust board elections so that all members are voted on at once, which makes it easier to oust a bad board.
Some votes even go so far as to suggest companies vest stock options only after enough time has passed to see whether management decisions really pay off.
These votes are generally nonbinding, but they send a message.
It also pays to follow news reports on efforts by activists to oust board members. CtW Investment Group, for example, this year successfully challenged Washington Mutual board member Mary Pugh. As the chairwoman of the bank's finance committee, part of her job was to monitor Washington Mutual's exposure to subprime risks.
CtW asserted in an open campaign against Pugh that her role might have been compromised by the fact that her company, Pugh Capital Management, managed a significant amount of money for Washington Mutual. Washington Mutual recently accepted Pugh's resignation after she did poorly in a shareholder vote.
Once independent boards are in place, they need to link pay to meaningful measures of growth, says Eleanor Bloxham, an executive-pay expert at The Value Alliance and the author of "Economic Value Management: Applications and Techniques."
Video: The highest-paid CEOs
They also need to deploy pay packages that hold back a portion of bonus pay until it's clear that executives have created lasting value. Without strong boards looking out for shareholders, it's not clear this will happen.
"A lot of executives don't like this because it really does hold them accountable," Bloxham says.
At the time of publication, Michael Brush did not own or control shares of any company mentioned in this column.
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