Also see Post: Violations at Turkey Point.These two reports are taken right off the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website and they are considered "More than minor" (Dec. 31, 2006 and June 30, 2007):
Significance: Green - Dec 31, 2006 -- Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Comply with Core Alteration Procedures for Handling of Irradiated Fuel
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 for failure to implement procedures during core alterations when operators failed to maintain reliable communications and to place irradiated fuel in a safe storage location when communications were lost between the refueling personnel and the control room. When identified to the licensee, the issue was entered into the corrective action program and actions to brief fuel handling personnel on procedure requirements were taken prior to resuming fuel movement.
The finding was more than minor because technical specification requirements to implement core alterations procedures were not being met. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 1, Checklist 4, a Phase 2 analysis was not required (conditions not met) and the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The Initiating Events cornerstone was affected because reliable communications and placement of the irradiated fuel assembly in a safe location on loss of communications would permit prompt protection of personnel and emergency response should a loss of the refueling water seal occur. The finding affects the cross cutting area of Human Performance - Work Practices because the licensee had not defined and effectively communicated expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures. (Section 1R20) And, on June 30, 2007:
Significance: Green - Jun 30, 2007 -- Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Maintain Design of Valves Important to Safety
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure of the licensee to promptly identify and correct the nonconformance of equipment important to safety, specifically the operation of air solenoids in the charging system outside the design maximum operating differential pressure (MOPD). When identified, the licensee scheduled repair/replacement of the solenoids.
The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as Green using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix A, because it represented a design deficiency that had not been evaluated but did not result in any loss of function. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, specifically Resources because the licensee did not minimize long-standing equipment issues and ensure maintenance backlogs were low enough to support safety, (MC 0305 aspect H.2(a)).
4 comments:
Why does the rule require States to consider the use of potassium iodide instead of mandating its use?
The NRC will not require use of potassium iodide by the general public because the NRC believes that current emergency planning and protective measures--evacuation and sheltering--are adequate and protective of public health and safety. However, the NRC recognizes the supplemental value of potassium iodide and the prerogative of the States to decide the appropriateness of the use of potassium iodide by its citizens.
The NRC believes the final rule together with the decision to provide funding for the purchase of a State's supply of potassium iodide strikes a proper balance between encouraging (but not requiring) State authorities to take advantage of the benefits of potassium iodide.
By requiring consideration of the use of potassium iodide, the Commission recognizes the important role of States and local governments in matters of emergency planning.
This rule applies to States and Tribal governments that have a nuclear power plant within their borders and populations within the 10-mile (10 MILES!!!!) emergency planning zone and to local governments designated by States to request funding for potassium iodide.
Frankly, I think the nukes are a bad idea. I would move as far from Turkey Point as possible. How are the people in the keys going to get out if they need to??
Boy, I am lucky! I am 2 blocks to Nw of the 10 mile boundary. Of course, there is the sea breeze which blows that way. Did they add that in the 10 miles?
[T]he finding was determined to be of very low safety significance.
The toilet paper roll was poinintg in instead of out! Call the NRC!
You guys kill me. Go back to reporting about real estate busts, or something else you might understand in a hundred years... LOL
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