Violations at Turkey Point by Geniusofdespair

I am just going to post, periodically, some of these violations I found at Turkey Point, exactly as published by the NRC, just so you know:
Aug 18, 2006
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: VIO Violation
Failure to assess and manage maintenance risk during shutdown operations

A violation of 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) was identified for failure to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk of performing maintenance on the A-train 480 volt 3C load center while Unit 3 was operating in decay heat removal mode with one operating A-train residual heat removal (RHR) pump. The licensee elected to move up restoration maintenance on the A-train 480 volt 3C load center and proceeded without implementation of procedurally required measures to reduce the risk during the activity. (Hit read more)

During the maintenance activity the licensee installed a breaker associated with 3C 480 volt load center that was later determined to be defective, which caused a loss of the operating A-train RHR pump. This resulted in a loss of all decay heat removal for seven minutes, which caused reactor coolant temperature to increase from 113 F to 140 F. The finding affected the cross cutting area of Human Performance, specifically the Work Control component because the licensee did not appropriately plan work activities using risk insights. The licensee entered this issue in the Corrective Action Program as condition report (CR) 2006-7036.

The finding was greater than minor because the risk assessment failed to account for the loss of decay heat removal during shutdown operations. The Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capacity of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences was affected by the finding. This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Shutdown Appendix G Phase 1 and 2 Significance Determination Process (SDP) templates and determined to be greater than Green. Subsequently, a Phase 3 assessment was performed and determined that there were two dominant core damage sequences. One sequence involved failure of operators to start either RHR train A or B before boiling began. In this scenario, the operators were assumed to successfully initiate feed and bleed cooling but failed to maintain a long term inventory source to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (recirculation requires the RHR pumps). The conditional core damage probability for this scenario was estimated as 3.5E-06. The other sequence involved failure of operators to start either RHR train A or B before boiling and the operators fail to initiate feed and bleed cooling before core damage, which was estimated to be 3E-6. Therefore, the risk significance of this finding was determined to be White. (IR 05000250, 251/2006015 dated August 24, 2006)

The Final Significance Determination for A White Finding and Notice of Violation letter was issued on November 22, 2006. For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report (No. 05000250/2006016) and the above violation is identified as VIO 05000250/2006016-01, White Finding - Failure to Assess and Manage Maintenance Risk During Shutdown Operations. Accordingly, Apparent Violation (AV) 05000250/2006015-01 is closed.
The Final Significance Determination for A White Finding and Notice of Violation letter was issued on November 22, 2006. For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report (No. 05000250/2006016) and the above violation is identified as VIO 05000250/2006016-01, White Finding - Failure to Assess and Manage Maintenance Risk During Shutdown Operations. Accordingly, Apparent Violation (AV) 05000250/2006015-01 is closed.