The UK Guardian just published an outstanding piece on the David Beckham saga for a new stadium. The Guardian asks, "Why did it take so long?", and proceeds to explain in detail more vivid and concise than the Herald.
First of all, Beckham came to Miami without the slightest idea of the lobbyist culture. Bring a scheme to Miami, and there will be a dozen lobbyists lined up to tell you, "no problem, we can make this happen." Thousand foot flagpoles with the American flag? No problem!
Secondly, Beckham misjudged the depth of anger of voters and taxpayers to the Marlins deal. But it's not just the Marlins. The Museum Park/ Biscayne Boulevard fiasco -- ie. billions of dollars spent without any sensible traffic plan -- tenderized Miamians for the Marlins. After Samson/ Loria et al: there was just no way another real estate giveaway on the Bay was going to happen. Add to that, the opposition of the cruise lines.
If MLS approves the Beckham proposal, the Overtown location is going to be just fine. Plus, it is private money building the stadium, which should have been the case for the Marlins as well.
UK Guardian
Why Miami made David Beckham work hard for his MLS stadium dream
The former LA Galaxy star is ‘closer than ever’ to an MLS team, but Miami’s complex politics ensured Beckham’s grand design was anything but a tap-in
Chris Smith in Miami
Friday 11 December 2015 04.00 EST Last modified on Friday 11 December 2015 05.08 EST
When David Beckham rolled into Miami in February 2014, promising and expecting the world, he probably didn’t foresee 22 months elapsing without a home for his planned MLS expansion franchise.
After a protracted struggle, which involved four publicly floated locations, objections from cruise lines, ludicrous demands from private landowners and calls to build a high school at the stadium, the former England captain finally has a venue in place.
The agreed-upon site in the Overtown district will enable the construction of a privately-funded 25,000 seat arena at an estimated cost of $250m. The Miami Beckham United group says it is “closer than ever,” while MLS owners approved the location over the weekend. It is now hoped a team can take the field as soon as 2018.
But why did it take so long? Why did a city initially so enamoured with the Beckham make life so difficult, despite his promise not to seek a dime of public cash?
It began just six weeks after Beckham’s initial pitch to the city. Artists’ impressions of a waterfront stadium at PortMiami overlooking the downtown skyline inspired awe.
However, Royal Caribbean Cruises, a top earner for the city, wasn’t fawning. It expressed “deep reservations,” claiming land was needed for continued port development and that traffic and parking strains would impede cruisegoers.
In a full-page ad in the Miami Herald, a Miami Seaport Alliance led by the liner insisted PortMiami was not viable “due to the risks a port stadium would pose to jobs, cruise and cargo operations, security, and the port’s promising future.”
With hindsight, the plan was fanciful; a home run swing from a group looking to get on base. However, it’s not as though Beckham’s ambitious pitch had come without encouragement. Promises had been made.
“The City of Miami and the people of Miami deserve a stadium that they’re proud of. And they deserve a stadium that’s in a great place,” Beckham had said. “The commissioners and the mayor have promised us that we will be downtown.”
A new Plan A soon emerged at an unused boat slip next to the Miami Heat’s American Airlines Arena. It was a plan supported by city and county mayors.
What followed were talks of an awkward land transfer from city to county, debates over property taxes and environmental concerns over an artificial reef. Two million dollars a year was offered in rent, but in June 2014, City mayor Tomás Regalado admitted the slip was “off the table.”
“Our team’s going to pause,” Beckham’s real estate adviser John Alschuler said. “They’re going to consider all alternatives and look forward to constructive engagement.”
And pause they did. After a year of radio silence, hopes began to ebb. Beckham himself reiterated his hope and confidence in interviews, but began to sound less convincing.
Meanwhile, MLS officials were shifting in their seats. Other markets like San Antonio and Sacramento poised themselves to jump in Miami’s designated spot as the league’s 24th team.
In May, MLS commissioner Don Garber appeared to be losing confidence in the group’s ability to find a suitable home.
“I believe that there is a possibility for us to be in Miami, but it does need to be right,” he said. “Just because an opportunity exists doesn’t mean that we’re going to close on that deal, because we want to be sure that any new team has the opportunity to be successful.”
Putting the squeeze on the Orange Bowl site
In July, a possibility sprang at the old Orange Bowl site adjacent to Marlins Park, a setting Beckham had originally rejected. However, by this point, the group was practically begging.
They had promised to transfer ownership of any stadium to the local school board, to reimburse schools for property taxes they may incur, spend $500,000 a year for the upkeep of community soccer fields and build a soccer academy.
The proposals represented “the most financially responsible, publicly-vetted stadium agreement Miami has ever seen,” investor Tim Leiweke wrote in a Miami Herald editorial.
And it all looked so promising until some textbook Florida absurdity undermined the entire deal. The Beckham group had pledged to pay ‘above market value’ for any land. One day-care owner with property valued at $368,000 asked for $30m, and the deal was as good as dead.
Three times Miami Beckham United had publically announced plans without having deals in place for the real estate. Three times those plans had failed. A lesson had finally been learned.
Despite Miami Beckham United’s vow to foot the entire bill for the stadium and seek no public assistance, Miami’s taxpayers and collectors had 2.4 billion reasons to resist Beckham’s considerable charm in favour of due diligence.
Less than a decade ago, the city and county granted a hugely controversial public investment of $490m to fund the Miami Marlins baseball park. Public cost will rise to an estimated $2.4bn over the next 40 years.
After pleading poverty and lying about the team’s earnings in order to secure funds, owner Jeffrey Loria’s pledge to create a competing team remains hopelessly unfulfilled, four seasons after Marlins Park opened.
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The club scrimps on payroll (30th, 29th, 29th in the last three years) and, even in the face of sparse attendances from a disenfranchised fan base, still profits from league revenue sharing rules.
Loria undoubtedly set a precedent, which has harmed the Beckham group. Future stadium proposals would be subject to far greater scrutiny and scepticism.
Even Miami Dolphins owner Steve Ross was denied public money for the $400m Sun Life Stadium renovations that should bring a Super Bowl back to South Florida as soon as 2019.
Underwhelmed with Overtown?
The newly agreed-upon location feels somewhat like consolation prize; fourth on the totem pole, below a site initially rejected. While it is relatively close to downtown and has great public transport links, Overtown is currently an unglamorous area politely referred to as the “urban core.”
Beckham and the MLS brass dreamed of channelling the European-style ritual of walking to the match, as adopted successfully by MLS fans in Seattle, Portland and Toronto.
“Football fans, soccer fans love to walk to games as a community – and I know that we’re going to have that here,” Beckham said initially.
Except Overtown isn’t the kind of place people like to walk right now.
Max Ramos-Paez of the Southern Legion fans group said: “People seem to like the location in terms of where it is in Miami. However, some don’t like that it’s in Overtown due to its notoriety as a dangerous area.”
Regeneration of the historic African American neighbourhood is underway, albeit amid protests over gentrification. The Miami MLS stadium will naturally play a large part in the plans to attract businesses and tourism in to the area.
As land will be owned outright, the group will be eligible to pay property taxes, a point of contention during discussions over leased land. The private deal also eschews the need for a potentially threatening public referendum, so there are plenty of positives.
Miami Beckham United still has some hurdles to overcome. It needs to negotiate a fair price for the county land, and proposals will need approval from Miami-Dade commissioners before a shovel hits the ground. They also want to close down an existing street on the stadium site, which is “a big deal,” according to Mayor Regalado.
“This is when the community needs to come out and speak about the stadium, he said. “The community needs to have a voice during the zoning changes.”
City manager Daniel Alfonso has told Beckham representatives “we’ll work with you,” and “we’re not going to obstruct anything,” but nothing is finalised just yet.
In terms of achieving his MLS Miami dream, Beckham is past the last defender and bearing down on goal. But it’s not a gimme. Miami soccer fans are hoping the iconic star tucks this chance away sharply. Who knows, after almost two years of biting nails, maybe those supporters can start to concern themselves with a team name, club colours, crests and players?
“We’re in extra time now. Let’s hope it doesn’t go to penalties,” said Ramos-Paez.
First of all, Beckham came to Miami without the slightest idea of the lobbyist culture. Bring a scheme to Miami, and there will be a dozen lobbyists lined up to tell you, "no problem, we can make this happen." Thousand foot flagpoles with the American flag? No problem!
Secondly, Beckham misjudged the depth of anger of voters and taxpayers to the Marlins deal. But it's not just the Marlins. The Museum Park/ Biscayne Boulevard fiasco -- ie. billions of dollars spent without any sensible traffic plan -- tenderized Miamians for the Marlins. After Samson/ Loria et al: there was just no way another real estate giveaway on the Bay was going to happen. Add to that, the opposition of the cruise lines.
If MLS approves the Beckham proposal, the Overtown location is going to be just fine. Plus, it is private money building the stadium, which should have been the case for the Marlins as well.
UK Guardian
Why Miami made David Beckham work hard for his MLS stadium dream
The former LA Galaxy star is ‘closer than ever’ to an MLS team, but Miami’s complex politics ensured Beckham’s grand design was anything but a tap-in
Chris Smith in Miami
Friday 11 December 2015 04.00 EST Last modified on Friday 11 December 2015 05.08 EST
When David Beckham rolled into Miami in February 2014, promising and expecting the world, he probably didn’t foresee 22 months elapsing without a home for his planned MLS expansion franchise.
After a protracted struggle, which involved four publicly floated locations, objections from cruise lines, ludicrous demands from private landowners and calls to build a high school at the stadium, the former England captain finally has a venue in place.
The agreed-upon site in the Overtown district will enable the construction of a privately-funded 25,000 seat arena at an estimated cost of $250m. The Miami Beckham United group says it is “closer than ever,” while MLS owners approved the location over the weekend. It is now hoped a team can take the field as soon as 2018.
But why did it take so long? Why did a city initially so enamoured with the Beckham make life so difficult, despite his promise not to seek a dime of public cash?
It began just six weeks after Beckham’s initial pitch to the city. Artists’ impressions of a waterfront stadium at PortMiami overlooking the downtown skyline inspired awe.
However, Royal Caribbean Cruises, a top earner for the city, wasn’t fawning. It expressed “deep reservations,” claiming land was needed for continued port development and that traffic and parking strains would impede cruisegoers.
In a full-page ad in the Miami Herald, a Miami Seaport Alliance led by the liner insisted PortMiami was not viable “due to the risks a port stadium would pose to jobs, cruise and cargo operations, security, and the port’s promising future.”
With hindsight, the plan was fanciful; a home run swing from a group looking to get on base. However, it’s not as though Beckham’s ambitious pitch had come without encouragement. Promises had been made.
“The City of Miami and the people of Miami deserve a stadium that they’re proud of. And they deserve a stadium that’s in a great place,” Beckham had said. “The commissioners and the mayor have promised us that we will be downtown.”
A new Plan A soon emerged at an unused boat slip next to the Miami Heat’s American Airlines Arena. It was a plan supported by city and county mayors.
What followed were talks of an awkward land transfer from city to county, debates over property taxes and environmental concerns over an artificial reef. Two million dollars a year was offered in rent, but in June 2014, City mayor Tomás Regalado admitted the slip was “off the table.”
“Our team’s going to pause,” Beckham’s real estate adviser John Alschuler said. “They’re going to consider all alternatives and look forward to constructive engagement.”
And pause they did. After a year of radio silence, hopes began to ebb. Beckham himself reiterated his hope and confidence in interviews, but began to sound less convincing.
Meanwhile, MLS officials were shifting in their seats. Other markets like San Antonio and Sacramento poised themselves to jump in Miami’s designated spot as the league’s 24th team.
In May, MLS commissioner Don Garber appeared to be losing confidence in the group’s ability to find a suitable home.
“I believe that there is a possibility for us to be in Miami, but it does need to be right,” he said. “Just because an opportunity exists doesn’t mean that we’re going to close on that deal, because we want to be sure that any new team has the opportunity to be successful.”
Putting the squeeze on the Orange Bowl site
In July, a possibility sprang at the old Orange Bowl site adjacent to Marlins Park, a setting Beckham had originally rejected. However, by this point, the group was practically begging.
They had promised to transfer ownership of any stadium to the local school board, to reimburse schools for property taxes they may incur, spend $500,000 a year for the upkeep of community soccer fields and build a soccer academy.
The proposals represented “the most financially responsible, publicly-vetted stadium agreement Miami has ever seen,” investor Tim Leiweke wrote in a Miami Herald editorial.
And it all looked so promising until some textbook Florida absurdity undermined the entire deal. The Beckham group had pledged to pay ‘above market value’ for any land. One day-care owner with property valued at $368,000 asked for $30m, and the deal was as good as dead.
Three times Miami Beckham United had publically announced plans without having deals in place for the real estate. Three times those plans had failed. A lesson had finally been learned.
Despite Miami Beckham United’s vow to foot the entire bill for the stadium and seek no public assistance, Miami’s taxpayers and collectors had 2.4 billion reasons to resist Beckham’s considerable charm in favour of due diligence.
Less than a decade ago, the city and county granted a hugely controversial public investment of $490m to fund the Miami Marlins baseball park. Public cost will rise to an estimated $2.4bn over the next 40 years.
After pleading poverty and lying about the team’s earnings in order to secure funds, owner Jeffrey Loria’s pledge to create a competing team remains hopelessly unfulfilled, four seasons after Marlins Park opened.
Advertisement
The club scrimps on payroll (30th, 29th, 29th in the last three years) and, even in the face of sparse attendances from a disenfranchised fan base, still profits from league revenue sharing rules.
Loria undoubtedly set a precedent, which has harmed the Beckham group. Future stadium proposals would be subject to far greater scrutiny and scepticism.
Even Miami Dolphins owner Steve Ross was denied public money for the $400m Sun Life Stadium renovations that should bring a Super Bowl back to South Florida as soon as 2019.
Underwhelmed with Overtown?
The newly agreed-upon location feels somewhat like consolation prize; fourth on the totem pole, below a site initially rejected. While it is relatively close to downtown and has great public transport links, Overtown is currently an unglamorous area politely referred to as the “urban core.”
Beckham and the MLS brass dreamed of channelling the European-style ritual of walking to the match, as adopted successfully by MLS fans in Seattle, Portland and Toronto.
“Football fans, soccer fans love to walk to games as a community – and I know that we’re going to have that here,” Beckham said initially.
Except Overtown isn’t the kind of place people like to walk right now.
Max Ramos-Paez of the Southern Legion fans group said: “People seem to like the location in terms of where it is in Miami. However, some don’t like that it’s in Overtown due to its notoriety as a dangerous area.”
Regeneration of the historic African American neighbourhood is underway, albeit amid protests over gentrification. The Miami MLS stadium will naturally play a large part in the plans to attract businesses and tourism in to the area.
As land will be owned outright, the group will be eligible to pay property taxes, a point of contention during discussions over leased land. The private deal also eschews the need for a potentially threatening public referendum, so there are plenty of positives.
Miami Beckham United still has some hurdles to overcome. It needs to negotiate a fair price for the county land, and proposals will need approval from Miami-Dade commissioners before a shovel hits the ground. They also want to close down an existing street on the stadium site, which is “a big deal,” according to Mayor Regalado.
“This is when the community needs to come out and speak about the stadium, he said. “The community needs to have a voice during the zoning changes.”
City manager Daniel Alfonso has told Beckham representatives “we’ll work with you,” and “we’re not going to obstruct anything,” but nothing is finalised just yet.
In terms of achieving his MLS Miami dream, Beckham is past the last defender and bearing down on goal. But it’s not a gimme. Miami soccer fans are hoping the iconic star tucks this chance away sharply. Who knows, after almost two years of biting nails, maybe those supporters can start to concern themselves with a team name, club colours, crests and players?
“We’re in extra time now. Let’s hope it doesn’t go to penalties,” said Ramos-Paez.
3 comments:
I love the Guardian, but even this article has an undercurrent that Beckham has a right to build a stadium and why hasn't Miami hasn't given it to him? Beckham's first two stadium plans were environmental and land use disasters. The third was a shoehorn. We'll see how much the public's on the hook for number four. Remember, stadiums don't generate rehabilitate communities. Just ask the folks around Dolphins Stadium, Tampa Rays stadium, Markins Stadium. There is absolutely no reason Beckham couldn't play his games in Malins, Dolphins or FIU stadiums.
Add the total mistrust of County Mayor Carlos Gimenez to the list of negatives that stalled the Beckham deal.
Gimenez had a list of punitive actions against the county's service infrastructure. It was a one track philosophy of slash and burn. The economy was in a recession and the Mayor used the opportunity to dismantle county government with disregard to services. The fire dept., the libraries, the police dept., the transit buses were all tapped, drained, and left for future taxpayers to pay for the costs of full replacement (or lawsuits from harm due to neglect) since maintenance was ignored. It's hard to trust a leader who leads by surprise. The County Commission and our community get insight into massive projects such as this soccer stadium, or a Donald Trump / Crandon Park Golf Course deal with little notice and pressure that everything is the Mayor's personal "done deal."
It's refreshing to see Loria called l out in print for what he is, a lying little weasel.. God know the local media kisses his advertising spending ass..
but everyone always knew Loria was a smuck, it was county manager George Burgess, who lead us to slaughter in the worst P3 deals in the county.
And where is George now after that record setting public sellout? Last I heard, serves as one of six gubernatorial appointees to the State’s P3 Partnership for Public Facilities Act Guidelines Task Force..
While Carlos Gimenez and George may not and been BFFs while George was county manager, clearly The Mayor is now one of George's P3 biggest acolytes.
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