NOTE: The original post, yesterday, attracted some interesting comments, including one by FPL's "Dave" ("Bob's" sibling?); the multi-billion dollar corporation that would not send representatives to face the public (at scheduled public hearings) on its nuclear safety and plans for new nuclear power plants at Turkey Point. I have more to say, later, on Dave's "shame on you".
FPL just reported to the NRC an unexpected partial drop of control rods at Turkey Point reactor 4. The control rod drop mechanism is the ultimate fail-safe for a nuclear reactor: if a reactor has a partial control rod drop when the it overheats, the core will meltdown. Read more about this "off normal" event:
Two rods dropped when none should have. That's a serious problem. ONLY two rods dropped. If any drop, they all should. That's much more disturbing. It indicates that the automated emergency shut-down system is not working properly.
No harm done this time because it was not an emergency, and because the manual drop mechanism worked. This time. Turkey Point 3 had control rod problems earlier this year and FPL should have reviewed and repaired the mechanisms on both reactors. FPL reacts when these old reactors break, but does not engage in sufficient preventative maintenance to keep them operating smoothly and reliably.
You might think this is a trivial matter, but another "off normal" event where the manual drop fails, too, would be more than an "off normal event": it would change your life in South Florida forever. A lot more than today's news, accurate FEMA maps.
Power Reactor Event Number: 45522
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROGER MONTGOMERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/27/2009
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2009
Event Time: 23:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
Event Text
TWO SHUTDOWN BANK RODS WERE DROPPED FROM FULLY WITHDRAWN POSITION
"With Unit 4 borated to a cold shutdown condition following the Unit 4 Cycle 25 refueling outage, post-modification acceptance testing was being performed on the Rod Position Indication System prior to reactor startup. While performing this test, two shutdown bank rods showed indication of being fully inserted from a fully withdrawn position. Off-normal procedures were entered and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was subsequently manually actuated. All remaining rods were fully inserted in accordance with plant procedures. Investigations are in progress to determine and repair the cause of the dropped rods."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
15 comments:
WTF???
So, it's FPL's province? They are the only authority to say what will be and can be done to upgrade maintanence protocols that address this? Time to write my Rep / Senator... and voice my fear...
good post! If, very upsetting during morning coffee. :-)
I hope you are updating Katy Sorenson's office on this. She seems to be the only concerned politician.
There is a management failure here, everyone keeps reducing these failures in importance. WRONG, IT IS A PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR.
Any time a reactor "overheats", it's overheated; rod drop or no. Dropping a rod or groups of rods during power operations causes a neutron flux tilt, which means the radial and/or axial neutron flux distribution is not per design. Untreated, this may result in discreet areas of power production in the core being higher than designed and over time, result in uneven fuel burn, though steady state to steady state, overall reactor power remains the same. It will not cause a meltdown. Dropping a rod or rods while the latching mechanism is energized indicates some kind of failure of the latching mechanism, or the electrical power system that is used to control it, or a glitch in a reactor protection system that involves control rod position or position indication.
Control rod systems in commercial pressurized water reactors (such as both units at Turkey Point) work on the principal of gravity. The control rods are held out of the reactor by a latching mechanism that allows the rod(s) to remain in a fixed position out of the core. The system never needs electricity to fail safe as a loss of power unlatches the mechanism and gravity (assisted by compressed spring pressure) drive rods to the bottom of the reactor in a fraction of a second, shutting it down.
Control rods can be driven into the reactor electrically, but the fail safe on a loss of power (or an operator "manually" tripping the reactor) results in the same thing, removing power to the latching mechanism; spring, gravity, etc.
You also fail to mention that this anomaly occurred during cold shutdown (depressurized and less than 200 degrees) during a post refueling outage test called cold rod stepping. This test is performed to detect any problems with the control rod system prior to heating up and pressurizing the system in preparation for reactor startup. The test identified a problem with two control rods that will have to be troubleshot, and cause determined and corrected prior to startup. The test did exactly what it is supposed to do.
To give the impression that because all the rods did not fail this test makes it a more serious event is flat wrong. The test determined all rods were functional except the two that dropped.
It is also interesting to note this test is performed at refueling boron concentration, as stated in FPL's report to the NRC. Boron is a chemical dissolved in the reactor coolant that absorbs neutrons, thus depressing the nuclear reaction. When at refueling boron concentration, neutron absorption is so high, all control rods can be withdrawn fully from the reactor core with no chance of reactor power increasing at all. Commercial reactors actually "dilute" boron concentration in the coolant to start up and take the reactor critical. During power operations, a balance of steam demand and boron concentration control reactor power and rod positioning controls system temperature. In this condition, boron concentration is such that that insertion of control rods results in immediate reactor shutdown.
I love Eye on Miami, but I don't appreciate someone crying wolf when no wolf is about. While reactor reactivity control issues (of which proper operation of the rod control system is one) are always serious and important, let's not get folks in a lather over something that was identified because FPL was following the required pre-startup rod control testing, and reported to the NRC as required by law. The plant management and workers must identify and correct the cause of the malfunction to the satisfaction of the NRC (who have to inspectors on site full time with unfettered access to any and all information and data they deem necessary) prior to proceeding any further.
Your post contains information that is untrue, information that comes in the form of half truths, and then uses that information to imply the sky is falling. Learn a little more before you speak.
Shame on you.
David, first thanks for your technical and there is no reason to doubt your likely correct explanation.
The overall problem with FPL/Turkey Point is the totality of incidents, minor, routine, expected are becoming words frequently used by those explaining the incidents.
Maybe instead of having empty seats reserved for FPL management to explain these lapses, issues, and occurrences to the community who came out twice this year to listen to FPL. Maybe just maybe, your employer will allow you to speak for them in a public forum.
Katy Sorenson put together two meetings on this topic last year and her response was no-shows from FPL.
Funny how this blog gets a response but the citizens of the area and a county commissioner get placecards with nobody behind them.
Community marketing by FPL needs some new paradigms.
Mismanagement or control rod failure was often the cause or aggravating factor for nuclear accidents, including the SL-1 explosion and the Chernobyl disaster.
Hey David you said:
"The test determined all rods were functional except the two that dropped."
That sounds like something is broken.
The top nuclear operator at Turkey Point resigned after a huge outage because he felt his bosses were demanding an unsafe restart in March --- the Xenon Effect.
- You know there is something very wrong over there. Guards sleeping, holes drilled in pipes. Come on David. Tell us the truth. What is really going on?
Although FPL found an unexpected problem with the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) during a powered down state,
1. The CRDM is not supposed to malfunction EVER. It's the ultimate failsafe on a reactor.
2. nothing suggests malfunctions would not occur at random times, such as during a powered state.
This time two rods went down with out explanation. If something broken in the deployment circuit, the rods could stick up or fall spontaneously depending on what is broken. Falling spontaneously is not so big a deal (lost revenue) as failing to fall (lost everything). Turkey Point had bad solder joints cause other malfunctions before. Earlier this year they had two rods stick in the other reactor. Why am I not fully comforted? At Three Mile Island the operators did not manually deploy the CRDM because they didn't believe what they were seeing. Safe operation dictates that automatic deployment works perfectly every time, not just when repaired recently. When rods are sticking or falling on their own, we have legitimate reason to fear that FPL is not doing sufficient preventative maintenance to keep the whole machine running safely. Does anyone imagine that Armando Olivera's helicopter mechanic waits to find broken parts before he repairs them? Nuclear reactors, like helicopters and jet planes, should be carefully maintained and should not break spontaneously, EVER. Anyone who thinks differently should have nothing to do with the operation of a nuclear reactor.
Significant safety equipment failures at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant are indicative of an aged plant that should be shut-down. These nuclear reactors were only designed to operate safely for 40-years. However, the NRC has approved operation for another 20-years. High-level radioactive particles have bombarded the stainless steel reactor vessels over the last 40-years and have embrittled the vessels subjecting them to a catastrophic crack and loss of coolant accident which would ultimately result in a core meltdown.
Why does the NRC continue to allow these plants to operate - with hundreds of thousands of lives in the balance?
Thomas Saporito
Jupiter, Florida
My simple plea.
There are a lot more innocent people living within the 10 mile radius of this plant than when it was built. The sea will soon reclaim the original cooling canals. People and the machines they build are fallible. Nuclear power generation leaves no room for fallability. Decommission this plant while there is still time and dont build any more, especially at sea level. Sorry FPL, we know it is your last stab at a really fat cash cow, but we are doing everything we can to make clean power generation profitable for you at the PSC and Legislature. Will you please help us?
FPL wants to keep selling electricity by the megawatt produced, not saved. It is no different from the sprawl industries: they gain on volume increase of units sold. Why won't FPL support compensation by demand reduction and efficiency? Maybe it is because efficient production and consumption doesn't add enough millionaires to its payroll.
The following report was received via facsimile:
"On the morning of November 17, 2009, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control received a phone call from a representative of US Steel in Fairfield, Alabama advising the Agency [Alabama Office of Radiation Control] of the discovery of radiation levels in a load of scrap metal. The entire load of scrap was set aside and isolated. On the morning of November 20, 2009, a representative of the Office of Radiation Control visited the USA Steel facility in Fairfield to assist in locating and identifying the source of radiation. The source of radiation was identified as a stainless steel rod approximately 12 inches in length and 3/4 inches in diameter. Maximum radiation levels of 150 millirem/hour were noted at close proximity to one end of the rod. Preliminary field analysis identified the isotope as Cs-137. Based on the configuration and isotope, the source of radiation may be a source rod from a moisture density gauge. The source of radiation was isolated and preliminary leak test results in the field indicate that the source is not ruptured. The Alabama Office of Radiation Control is currently investigating where the source of radiation originated.
"This is all the information that this Agency [Alabama Office of Radiation Control] has at this time and is current as of 10:30 am central time, November 23, 2009."
Alabama Incident 09-43.
This is from a March 27, 2009 inspection at Turkey Point, all were considered not significant:
Corrective Action - Condition Report
2009-4946, Hot Ring-down number not used human performance error
2009-4956, Control Room crew did not have specific procedure to direct reactor shutdown
2009-4972, Re-entry team procedure (20111) not followed by Operations
2009-4947, Control of security team during an emergency
2009-4958, Chemistry procedure 3-NCZP-094.1 needs enhancement for PASS
2009-4934, During graded exercise some confusion on feeding steam generators
2009-4939, Aux feed flow at 300 gpm, need to confirm simulator values
2009-4860, Core damage assessment in EOF not clear or precise
2009-4871, Use of 10CFR50.54(x) by security
2009-4916, Delay of briefing to State and Locals resulted in sirens sounded 49 minutes after
notification
2009-4926, Review the Potassium Iodide policy on-site
On January 22, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $208,000 was issued was issued for a Severity Level II problem consisting of
(1) the licensees failure to ensure, on or about April of 2004, that each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with an NRC Order issued on February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f);
(2) the licensees failure to ensure, on or about August 2005, that each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with the licensee Physical Security Plan;
(3) a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, incomplete and inaccurate information; and
(4) the failure of the licensee to make a one hour report to the NRC as required in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Paragraph 1.l(a)(3).
It took them 2 years to figure out a pump was NOT WORKING???
On April 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the licensee's failure to restore the B auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump to operable status within 30 days, to place the unit in at least Hot Standby during this time, and to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality even though pump bearing vibration levels and oil samples provided indication of the adverse condition. In this case, the B AFW pump was placed in service on September 10, 2003, in an inoperable condition due to a misaligned radial bearing, and the inoperable condition was not identified until November 7, 2005. The Notice of Violation cited the licensee’s failure to implement the requirements in Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
I thought the NRC requires one of their employees on site daily... and they are rotated? Is the employee at Turkey Point out to lunch?
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